Riding, hunting, fishing, bullfighting: Human-animal relations are diverse. This anthology presents various case studies of situations in which humans and animals come into contact and asks for the anthropological and philosophical implications of such encounters. The contributions by renowned scholars such as Albert Piette and Kazuyoshi Sugawara present multidisciplinary methodological reflections on concepts such as embodiment, emplacement, or the »conditio animalia« (in addition to the »conditio humana«) as well as a consideration of the term »situationality« within the field of anthropology.

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Editorial Preface

THIEMO BREYER & THOMAS WIDLOK

How are animal-human relations situated? What characterizes such situations? And how can situtionality as a theoretical concept help to elucidate ethnographic descriptions and vice versa? For current anthropological and philosophical inquiries into animal-human relations, these turn out to be highly relevant questions. To investigate the numerous kinds of engagements in environments that are shaped by humans, animals, and material objects at the same time, the authors in this book make use of the concepts of situation, embodiment, and emplacement in developing their diverse theoretical and methodological approaches on the topic. In line with the traditions of social phenomenology and ethnographic anthropology, we propose that all encounters take place or are embedded and shaped by situations and thus it is important to spell out what constitutes a situation and what kinds of situations we can differentiate. Between the momentary situation of being in the same place with another sentient being and an overarching historical situation (e.g. the “colonial situation”, a “hunting-ban situation”, etc.), a variety of situations open up as fields of research and as frames for studying relations between humans and animals. These are investigated by the contributions to this volume in an interdisciplinary way, bringing together insights from anthropological fieldwork and theory as well as phenomenological analyses of conceptual resources and intimate (inter-)subjective experience.

An underlying intuition of our project is that the concept of “situation” has theoretical benefits over the broader concept of “context”—which is more common in hermeneutical approaches in anthropology and beyond.—“Situation” emphasises the materiality and bodiliness of agentivity. The referential structure connecting actions and situations is thereby not conceived as some kind of abstract intertextuality, but as an intercorporeal indexicality. For the case of human-animal
relations, this makes particular sense, insofar as we cannot presuppose a linguistically mediated cognitive infrastructure between interactants. Describing animal-human encounters in terms of a communicative context of shared symbols therefore has its problems while describing it in terms of shared situations introduces less of a human bias and puts the participants more on a par with each other.

Referring to “situation” instead of “cultural contexts” and similar more conventional concepts also profits from situations being “singular multiplicities” (J. Zigon), i.e. they are characterized by the singularity of a situation (that affects individuals in a particular constellation) and by the assemblages that multiply across space and time (and regularly channel what can be done). Sometimes this relation is expressed by distinguishing “situations” (plural of “a situation”) and “situation” (“the situation of”), but explicating the productive tension between singularity and multiplicity is one of the key questions that need to be addressed. Again, for our reflections on animal-human relations this makes particular sense in that humans and animals encounter one another in both ways at the same time, as singular individual selves and as representatives of their recognizable kind. For an anthropological theory of human-animal relations this double-link, to singularity recorded in ethnographic descriptions and to multiplicity captured in cultural analyses, therefore promises to be a productive and innovative perspective. Our effort was to bring together experts from (phenomenological) philosophy and anthropology to investigate the value of “situation” and “situationality” as conceptual tools for ethnographic investigations in general and the analysis of human-animal relations in particular. Thus, our goal was twofold: firstly to enhance our understanding of animal-human relations and secondly to continue and deepen the disciplinary dialogue between anthropology and phenomenological philosophy.

This collective volume emerged out of a conference held at the University of Cologne in February 2017. We would like to thank the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne for providing the excellent infrastructure for organizing this event and the DFG-funded Collaborative Research Centre 806 “Our Way to Europe” as well as the University of Cologne Competence Area IV “Cultures and Societies in Transition” for their generous financial support. For their invaluable help during the editorial work on this book, we would like to express our gratitude to Carina Sperber, Erik Norman Dzwiza, Andrew Krema, and Zachary Hugo. Last but not least, we thank the editors of “Human-Animal Studies” for accepting our volume into their series and the staff at transcript for the frictionless process of printing.
Abstract: The primary aim of this chapter is to offer a philosophical toolkit for understanding our lifeworldly experience of nature. With this task in mind, Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) phenomenological methods will be brought together with some of Karl Bühler’s (1879–1963) linguistic considerations in order to make sense of key terms concerning the human-animal relation, such as ‘lifeworld’, ‘nature’, ‘animal’, ‘situation’ and ‘context.’ The first task is to understand how we experience nature in our lifeworld. Despite the fact that Husserl never gives us as a systematic approach to the experience of nature in the lifeworld, he nonetheless provides us with all we need for such an undertaking by investigating the lived body as a source of experiencing nature from the so-called personalistic attitude. This point of entry helps us to capture the situationality of the lifeworld in at least four aspects, which we presumably share with higher animals: (1) Orientation, (2) expression, (3) praxis and will, and (4) value and feeling. The third step is to show that all aspects taken together are crucial for embodied interaction as a common ground for human-animal relations, with a special emphasis on the constitution of common habitūs with pets. With the help of Bühlers distinction between situation and context, it is to be shown that common habitūs could be understood as a resource of implicit knowledge, thus informing our situated practices with pets. This leads to a final question: Can pets become persons in our lifeworld? Above all, such an attempt at a scientific approach to the lifeworldly experience of nature could be seen as a first but necessary step for investigating more complex relations in this regard, such as those between phenomenology, psychology, and anthropology on the one hand, and the lifeworldly, natural, and human sciences on the other.
1. **INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES ‘EXPERIENCING AND KNOWING NATURE’ MEAN?**

Despite the rich history of the philosophy of nature, especially in the biologically informed philosophical anthropology of the 20th century (see for instance Uexküll 1909, Plessner 1975 [1928], Scheler 1928, Gehlen 1940, Portmann 1956, Buytendijk 1991 [1965], or Jonas 1973), there is, curiously enough, *no scientific approach to the study of nature from a lifeworldly perspective*. This may rightly seem quite remarkable, given the prominence of nature in our daily experience. Imagine, for example, that you are walking through botanical gardens, eating an apple while enjoying the sun and watching dogs play, when you come across a jogger wearing a t-shirt protesting the laboratory use of animals. There are not only different types of experiences of nature captured in this brief example (i.e., aesthetic, sensual, and political), but there is also a constant interweaving of the scientific knowledge of nature with the lifeworldly experience of it. With regards to the former, we could refer to the knowledge of nature provided by the natural and human sciences, which are familiar to us by studying subjects as physics, biology or geography, on the one hand, and philosophy, history, or archeology, on the other. Evidently, these ways of ‘experiencing and knowing nature’ inform each other, making it quite a tricky issue to decide where to draw the line between lifeworld and science. This situation becomes even more complex if we take media into account. While walking in the botanical garden, for example, you could try to compare the biological names and information written on the plaques with what you know about the phenomena of plants and google the history of their first exploration (for the difference of *Folk taxonomy and scientific taxa* see Clark 1994:17-23). In light of this complicated initial situation it seems quite plausible that there is no scientific approach to the lifeworldly experience of nature. That is why the aim of this chapter is to provide a framework for this particular experience.¹

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¹ The idea and central assumptions of this chapter were inspired by my dissertation, which is expected to be published in 2019.
1.1 Husserl’s *Ideas II* as a starting point

In the following, I suggest that we can find such a framework in the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, more precisely in his *Ideas II*. After giving us a *General Introduction to a pure Phenomenology* in *Ideas I* (Husserl 1976a), and reflecting on *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences* in *Ideas III* (Husserl 1971), Husserl now offers us *Phenomenological Investigations of Constitution* (Husserl 1991) in *Ideas II*.

The book is divided in three sections, each inquiring into the ‘constitution’ of a specific “region of realities” (Husserl 1971: 42, my own transl.): After investigating the *Constitution of Material Nature* and the *Constitution of Animal Nature*, in section three Husserl examines the *Constitution of the Spiritual [geistige] World*. It should seem obvious, *prima facie*, that the first and second section should earn our attention. Unfortunately, on a closer look, they turn out to be disappointingly unhelpful for our purposes, because nature is not understood there in a lifeworldly manner. Fortunately, however, understanding the reasons for this disappointment brings us closer to what we are looking for.

The two most basic assumptions of Husserl’s investigations in *Ideas II* are that (1) all sciences are founded by a specific region, which determines how the former are to be understood, and that (2) the phenomenologist is able to identify the acts performed by subjective consciousness which are most relevant for the constitution of every region (cf. Husserl 1976a: 321). Husserl’s analysis therefore starts with remarks on a specific idea of nature connected to the relation between subject and object: The primary object of Husserl’s interest in the first two sections is the idea of nature as understood by the natural sciences of the modern era (Husserl 1989: 1-4). There he seeks to clarify how our subjective experience constitutes the possibility of developing this specifically modern understanding of nature in terms of a causal nexus of material and animated objects (which are studied particularly within physics, biology, and psychology).

Rather than jumping straight into the depths of such analyses of constitution, it is important to consider first Husserl’s general notion of the concept of ‘attitude.’ It unveils that the nature of modern science is experienced by ‘theoretical subjects’

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2 The book *Ideas II* is mainly based on manuscripts written between 1912 and 1918, but which were first published posthumously in 1952 as Vol. IV of the collected works, the Husserliana. For its history see the introductions and annotations of the editor of Husserl (1991). Because of its complicated history, there will be a new edition in 2018, edited by Dirk Fonfara in cooperation with the Husserl Archives in Cologne, Germany.
in a correlative mode called the ‘theoretical attitude’ (cf. ibid.: 2f.). The implications of this are striking for our interest, because understanding nature through the theoretical attitude leads to a systematic exclusion of the attitude of the “valuing and the practical subject.” Thus, experiencing nature as something with value and practical usability (ibid.: 2) is excluded: “In ordinary life,” Husserl emphasizes,

[... ] we have nothing whatever to do with nature-Objects [in the sense of natural science]. What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, tables, clothes, tools, etc. These are all value-Objects of various kinds, use-Objects, practical Objects. They are not Objects which can be found in natural science. (Ibid.: 27)

Before we go deeper into the structure of the lifeworldly experience of nature, two comments on Husserl’s notion of attitude should be mentioned in relation to, respectively, (1) their performing subject, and (2) their possible intertwining. First, such attitudes are not totally distinct in the concrete performance of the subject. Husserl illustrates the relation of attitudes with the example of a physician: Depending on which attitude we are actually “living in” a “change of attitude” (ibid.: 8) takes place. Such a change could be caused by different motives, be it the radiant beauty of the sky or the practical need of observation interfering with the theoretical considerations (cf. ibid.). Secondly, attitudes intertwine with each other in complex forms: There is not just the possibility of judging, valuing and acting in the theoretical attitude, thus creating ‘logical’, ‘axiological’ and ‘praxeological’ theories (cf. ibid.: 8-11), but also there can be a blurring of theory, value, and praxis in the routines of most professions.

To keep a long story short, we can distill the attitudes mentioned above into two main types: On the one hand the theoretical attitude of the natural sciences, which Husserl later calls the “naturalistic attitude”; on the other hand the non-theoretical attitude of ordinary life, including values and practical aspects, which Husserl later calls the “personalistic attitude” (ibid.: 173f.; cf. Ferencz-Flatz 2017: 220f.). Precisely this latter type of experience is broadly discussed under the title

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3 As we see, aesthetics is a sub-dimension of the axiological attitude called the “affective” or “pleasure attitude” which grasps the natural environment in an original way (Husserl 1989: 8; cf. Husserl 1973a: 93; for the relation aesthetic-theoretical attitude see Lembeck 1999). With this in mind, one could understand the work of Romanticism as an inspiring resource for descriptions of nature within the aesthetic attitude.

4 Both attitudes, the naturalistic and the personalistic, remain naive, compared to the transcendental attitude of the phenomenologist. Whereas the latter brackets the experienced existence of the world in order to investigate the subjective constitution thereof, natural
‘spiritual world,’ the topic of the third section of the book. And this is the key for the understanding of the lifeworld.

1.2 Personalistic attitude, spiritual world and the lifeworld

As we have seen so far, the personalistic attitude concerns exactly what is ruled out in the naturalistic attitude. It is the attitude in which we are most of the time in our lives and on which the specialized attitudes of sciences, be they natural or humanist, are founded (cf. Husserl 1989: 143). Because of this we should not wonder at the fact that the ‘spiritual world’, which we experience within the personalistic attitude, seems quite familiar to us. It is a cultural-historical world, in which we act as practical, valuing, and expressive persons; as such, we are gifted with certain skills which we develop, evaluate, and perform in concrete interaction within a complex society (which includes artefacts, institutions, etc.) (cf. ibid.: 172-302). This world, which is structured by motivation, expression, and understanding, has got—seen from the phenomenological standpoint—an “ontological priority” (ibid.: 281). Seen under this light, both the sciences and the scientists appear as historical products of a specialized and partial worldview which is necessarily founded in the personalistic experience of the spiritual world (cf. Husserl 1989: 374-378). Combined with phenomenology’s aspiration to understand the objective structure of this subjective world (cf. Husserl 1976: 126-138), I follow Manfred Sommer in interpreting the spiritual world as Husserl’s “first phenomenology of lifeworld” (1984: ix). The most important consequence of this assumption for our question is that terms like ‘lifeworld’ and ‘spiritual world’ on the one hand, and ‘personalistic attitude’ and ‘lifeworldly attitude’ on the other hand become synonymous.5

Taking this for granted, the Husserlian analyses of the spiritual world may seem to be a rich source for the lifeworldly experience of nature. But appearances and human scientific research is performed while the natural belief of the real existence of the world remains active (cf. Husserl 1976a: 56-71). For the relation of the natural to the personalistic attitude, which cannot be discussed in this context, see Staiti 2009: 225-228; Luft 2002: 7; Orth 1999: 126; Crowell 1996: 98; Sommer 1984: xxxiii-xxxv.

Further consequences are: (1) There is an early and a late version of a phenomenology of the lifeworld in Husserl, which are (2) both led by the idea of grasping the objective structure of subjective experience, despite the fact that (3) there is an experienced plurality of lifeworlds (cf. Husserl 1973b:177). For Husserl’s later phenomenology of lifeworld see Husserl (1976b) and its supplemental volumes (Husserl 1993, 2008).
are deceitful. Nowhere does Husserl give a broader analysis our lifeworld experience of nature from the perspective of the personalistic attitude—neither in his early (cf. Crowell 1996: 87), nor in his later investigations of the lifeworld (cf. Dzwiza, unpublished dissertation: part II, ch. 3). The question of the underlying reasons becomes urgent when we consider that the method used would in principle have been able to capture nature from a personalistic point of view. One main reason could be the powerful opposition between nature and spirit which was a widespread topic of discourse in academia, mainly at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (cf. Orth 2003). If we reconsider the structure of Ideas II, it becomes obvious that precisely this opposition holds sway throughout this book: The whole work has as its guiding thread the gap between nature, the natural sciences, and the naturalistic attitude on the one hand, and spirit, the human sciences, and the personalistic attitude on the other. On the basis of this strict opposition, Husserl was not able to give a systematic approach to a hybrid topic: namely, the experience of nature from the personalistic attitude—despite the fact that Husserl himself was quite aware of the problematic character of this strict opposition and longed for a more sufficient solution (cf. Husserl 1968: 54; Husserl 1968: 376f.; Husserl 1976b: 298f.).

Such a diagnosis should not make us surrender: While Crowell may indeed be right in saying that there is “in the personalistic attitude […], curiously, no determinate idea of nature at all” (1996: 99, emphasis in original), there are at least some ‘vague ideas’ connected to rich descriptions of the two main sources through which we experience nature in lifeworld: our lived body and our surrounding world.

2. The Lived Body as a Source of Experiencing Nature in the Lifeworld

2.1 A personalistic perspective on the lived body

Before we start to investigate our lived body as a source of experiencing nature in the lifeworld, a brief reference to the idea of the phenomenological method should be given: To provide something like a phenomenology of nature as experienced from the personalistic attitude means to take the word ‘experienced’ seriously. If one describes human-animal interactions in an anthropomorphic way and bases this description on alleged perceived reality, it is not the goal of transcendental phenomenology to falsify this description. Rather, the goal of phenomenology is to understand the constitutive principles involved in the description of any object
In order to achieve this, transcendental phenomenology captures both the underlying attitude (natural, naturalistic, personalistic, etc.) and the act of the subject (perceiving, phantasizing, feeling) and thus compares the meaning of the most relevant terms with the experience of the object. As we have seen, the meaning of the term nature depends on the attitude in which we live. Within the personalistic attitude we experience (nature-)objects as something with value and practical usability, implying, as we will see, emotional and, as mentioned above, aesthetic qualities. If we now try to capture the experience of nature from this personalistic attitude, one could argue that the term ‘personalistic’ already entails the exclusion of natural phenomena. But how do we perceive nature in our daily lives if not through the eyes of our personal, enculturated outlook? (Cf. Ferencz-Flatz 2017: 218f.)

If we begin, therefore, with this methodological assumption, then we also see that Husserl comprehensively deals with the two main ‘fields’ through which we experience nature in the lifeworld: The ‘lived body’ (cf. Staiti 2009: 224) and our “surrounding world” (Husserl 1989: 193, original emphasis). But it nonetheless remains a problem that Husserl was, for reasons mentioned above, not able and willing to give a phenomenological interpretation of the lifeworldly experience of nature. On the one hand, the nature-side of the ‘lived body’ is not personalistic enough, because it is mostly understood in relation to the naturalistic idea of nature; on the other hand, the ‘surrounding world’ seems too personalistic, because it is mostly understood in relation to the spiritual.

Yet, what we do have are a few passages that demarcate acute ways through which nature is experienced from a lifeworldly perspective. To show this, I want to give a quick overview of Husserl’s considerations of the lived body and enrich these Husserlian thoughts with termini technici given to us by Karl Bühler. In this way, we will see that the lived body functions as the key for all further considerations thanks to its unique meaning for our lifeworldly experience in at least four aspects: orientation (1), expression (2), praxis (3), and value (4).

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6 We could imagine the possibility of an impersonal experience of nature, e. g. in depersonalization by drug usage or trance states. But these are rare cases that do not reduce the evidence of our claims here.

7 Therefore, it is not accidental that the translators of Ideas II had chosen the term ‘surrounding world’ for the original German term ‘Umwelt,’ which could also be translated as ‘environment,’ and was already used in this sense by Uexküll (1909). For the relation of Husserl to Uexküll, see Ferencz-Flatz (2017: 222, 226ff.).
2.2 Embodied experience as situated experience: Orientation and expression

By drawing on both Husserl and Bühler, it is possible to delineate how the lived body appears as the center of orientation in a lifeworldly situation, be it spatial, temporal, or personal. What Bühler calls the “Origo” is nothing other than the “here-now-I system of subjective orientation” structuring every kind of “situation” (Bühler 1990: 102, 149). This means that, for Bühler, situationality is necessarily bodily-oriented. Fittingly, the body is a central topic in Husserlian phenomenology. Between 1907 and 1911, Husserl explored the crucial role of the sensible and motile body for the constitution of the most fundamental structures of our world, be it spatial, temporal, or personal (cf. Husserl 1973a: 190, 1973c: 80, 224). Yet, rather than focusing on certain points found in these earlier phenomenological investigations of the body—most notable of which being the intertwining of the extensive/expressive ‘Körper’ and the sensible/sensing ‘Leib’—we could draw our attention to Ideas II, in which all these particular insights were combined in the analyses of the spiritual world.

In addition to this aspect of orientation, the fact that the body is expressive is of utmost relevance for our lifeworld, because all communication goes with expression (cf. Husserl 1989: 231-248). As such, expression indicates a “unity of Body and spirit” (ibid.: 241) through which sense comes to expression. “Empathy into persons” is by this definition “nothing else than precisely that apprehension which understands the sense” (ibid.: 244, original emphasis). By understanding through expression that other persons see me as I see them, I “fit myself into the family of men”, as a “social man, as a comprehensive unity of Body and spirit”, (ibid.: 242, original emphasis). Thus, precisely through expressive communication we become a part of a spiritual world (cf. ibid.: 196f.), of a “communal spirit” (ibid.: 243, original emphasis). This becomes even more evident when one considers that this unity of an expressive body with a spirit fulfilled by sense is the

8 In the English translation, the distinction between these German terms is indicated by the capitalization of the initial letter: i.e., “body” (Körper) and “Body” (Leib) (Husserl 1989: 240; for the translators’ justification of this stratagem, see ibid.: xiv-xv). When citing the official English translation of Ideas II, I will abide by this convention. However, within the text, I will continue to follow the more common convention of translating “Leib” as “lived body” and reserving “body” for “Körper,” as I have already done.
basic pattern of our social-cultural world. We could find it metaphorically in language, in cultural artifacts and institutions, as well as quite literally in the lived body, i.e. through facial expressions, gestures, and voice.

We could deepen the orientation dimension of the ‘Origo’ by taking into consideration the expressive qualities of the body. First, every vocal utterance specifies the situation by referring to a space, a time, and a person which function, respectively, as “mark of the place,” “mark of the moment,” and as “mark of the sender” of the individual’s voice (Bühler 1990: 107). Second, we can point out something distinct in this situation through gesture, viewing, or language. This pointing Bühler calls *deixis* “ad oculos” (Bühler 1934: 80, original emphasis), which is just the Greco-Latin name for ‘pointing at the visible.’ Pointing at the visible is not just an economical way to refer to something particular which is situated in the “deictic field” surrounding our body through gesture, viewing, or “deictic particles” (Bühler 1990: 81), it is also crucial for the whole system and genesis of language (cf. ibid.: 80ff., and below).

### 2.3 Embodied nature experience: Will and practice, feeling and value

It is important to note that living as a person in the lifeworld means that we explore our lived body not just as crucial for our spatio-temporal orientation and expression, but also as our primary “organ of the will” (Husserl 1989: 159, original emphasis), which mediates between the stimuli of the environment and the actions of a person:

> Wherever external things in my sphere of appearances function as practical stimuli, wherever tendencies arise—directed to me—to move things, work with them, change them, etc., there my Body is mediating and so are the tendencies related to it, tendencies to grasp, lift, push, resist, strike etc. (Ibid.: 295)

As far as we can see, the things of our surrounding world can ‘function as practical stimuli’ for our lived body, as “the organ of original free movements” (ibid.), and thus give rise to tendencies to do something. Yet, such motivations for actions come not just from inanimate objects, animals (see Husserl 1989: 241f.), and persons in our surrounding world, but from one’s own lived body as well. This becomes clear when Husserl discusses the intertwining of decision-making and personal “faculties” (ibid.: 266). Precisely these faculties are captured by Husserl in the famous investigation on the “spiritual” and “physical” “I can”—which refers to an intuitive, but explicable knowledge of our spiritual and bodily abilities which
delimit our practical possibilities (ibid., original emphasis). To exemplify such ‘I can’s,’ one could think of simple abilities like seeing or walking for the physical ‘I can,’ and of thinking or phantazising for the spiritual ‘I can’ (cf. ibid.: 266f.). Both types have in common the fact that, despite the biological inheritance of such abilities, we still have to develop them over the course of our lives, and the risk of losing them constantly remains (e.g. by accident or aging). Throughout our history such abilities become something we take for granted—an implicit ground or a “total style and habitus of the subject” (ibid.: 290, original emphasis; for habitu-alization see the contribution of Wehrle in this volume). While the topic of habitu-alization will become crucial at the end of this investigation, the most relevant aspect for our current concerns comes to the fore if we consider how the ‘I-can’-structure is guided by bodily necessities, which can generally be classified as tendencies:

[A]ll life of the spirit is permeated by the ‘blind’ operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives, tendencies which emerge in obscurity, etc., all of which determine the subsequent course of consciousness according to ‘blind’ rules. (Ibid.: 289; cf. ibid.: 267f.)

In addition to the physical ‘I can,’ which forms a unity with the spiritual ‘I can,’ one could argue that here Husserl also describes something like the bodily ‘I ought to’ that shapes our lifeworld experience—and which could be seen as a rich field of familiarity with the natural. One could think, on the one hand, of the sensations of the inner organs (cf. Husserl 1973a: 44), be it the urge to defecate or urinate or be it hunger or thirst; but we could also think, on the other hand, of bodily “sensations of pleasure and pain” or “sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, sensations of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation etc.” (Husserl 1989: 160). That means, in analogy to the bodily sensations necessary for the appearance of things, we have bodily sensations necessary for the appearance of feelings and values (cf. ibid.: 159f.). In view of this, Husserl speaks of “value-reception” (Wert-nehmung) as an “analogon of perception” (Wahrnehmung). He defines the former as “the most original constitution of value” in the “sphere of feelings” (ibid.: 11, original emphasis). What we have here is nothing other than the natural-side of our lived body to which we have grown accustomed, i.e. that which guides our will and praxis and our values and feelings in interaction with the lifeworld. Fittingly, Husserl designates what he calls ‘associations, drives, feelings’ as a “basis of nature (“my nature”) which is manifest in the play of lived experiences.” (Ibid.: 293, original emphasis; regarding the interpretation of human nature as animalistic
and emotional cf. Midgley 1994: 35-38). Because of this dynamic relation between the bodily and the spiritual aspect in regard to the practical will and felt value-reception, Husserl claims that “a human being’s total consciousness is [...] bound to the body” (ibid.: 160, original emphasis).

3. **Embodied Communication and Interaction as Common Grounds for Human-Animal-Relations**

What we have sketched out so far are two intertwined ways of experiencing nature from our lifeworldly perspective related to our lived body: on the one hand, through praxis, which is connected to the will, and on the other hand, through value, which is connected to feelings. In this way, we broadened the range of Husserl’s phenomenology. Now we have to broaden it further in order to understand those beings with which we share the experience of a lived body: animals.\(^9\) If we begin with this supposition—by performing “an assimilating modification of the empathy between humans” (Husserl 1973b, 182)\(^10\)—it seems justifiable to assume that most animals have all four elements which show up in experiencing their surrounding world: (1) orientation, (2) expression, (3) will and praxis, and (4) feeling and value-reception. As we have already mentioned, Husserl’s analyses of the spiritual world are mostly concerned with the complex relation between persons and their surrounding world.\(^11\) But if we consider our cultural practices within the spiritual world, then animals seem to be an unmissable part of it, as Christian Ferencz-Flatz (2017: 223) highlights:

> [...] animals are today raised, bred, mutated, kept, sold and eaten in various human institutions like zoos, industrial farms, slaughter houses, research labs, pet shops or restaurants, while our everyday experience of them is marked by representations of the toy industry, cartoons, cinema, video games, magazines or TV shows, which essentially adapt them to our human world by conferring upon them predicates of human meaning and interest.

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9. For the lifeworldly relation of the homeworld-alienworld to nature, see Husserl 1973b: 177, 179; Ferencz-Flatz 2017: 223.

10. All following translations of the Husserl 1973b are my own due to the lack of an official translation.

11. The passages relevant for a phenomenological approach to animals are very poor and nowhere else, to my knowledge, does Husserl give us some more extensive investigations (cf. Husserl 1989: 192, 200, 208, 251, 328f., 377).
In view of the omnipresence of animals in our world, it seems advisable to consider one of the most remarkable relations human and animals have with each other, a relation which became possible only because of domestication and industrialization: the relation to pets (regarding other relationships see the further contributions of this volume). According to Husserl, pets are a special case of animals, “insofar as they have been raised and educated by humans, they have acquired certain traits of humanity” (Husserl 1973: 626). In order to grasp the extraordinary nature of this relationship, the notions of embodied communication and direct interaction will serve as a common ground for human-animal relations in general and human-pet relations in particular (with regard to indirect forms of human-animal relationships, such as in literature or totemism, see e.g. Midgley 1994: 36ff.; Tapper 1994: 49-52).

3.1 Embodied communication with animals

If we take a first look at how direct communication between pet and human comes about, it usually concerns the most basic needs of the lived body, which we have conceptualized in terms of ‘I have to.’ Precisely these needs, which motivate their own expression, are a way in which we communicate with animals in specific situations when we are trying to make sense of something.

For instance, if our pet is hungry, sick, or hurt we could find complex forms of communication, which could be analyzed by adapting Bühler’s “organon model of language” (Bühler 1990: 28). If we look at the “sender,” we have expressive “symptom[s]” (ibid., original emphasis): Such symptoms could be expressed in a bodily way, like a wound; they could be expressed by a specific non-verbal language, for example, a dazed look or the refusal to eat; or they could be expressed by verbal utterances, like a sudden yelping or snarling if we touch the wound of our pet. All these symptoms appear as an inviting “signal” if we look at them from the perspective of the “receiver” (ibid., original emphasis). Already the understanding of one another as, respectively, sender and listener proves that there is communication, implying self-awareness and prediction (see Coy 1994: 80f.; Midgley 1994: 40): When, for instance, my cat begins to mewl when she observes me preparing food, she conceives of me, on the one hand, as a sender of a non-verbal language connected to the sensual dimension of this feeding-situation, and,

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12 I would like to leave it to the reader to check this formal definition for her or his self, without restricting it to specific animals.

13 One could consider forms of indirect and involuntary communication like a hunter following traces of a specific animal (cf. Husserl 2008: 510).
on the other hand, she addresses her expression to me as a listener. At the same
time, I understand her as a sender of expressions as signals, though I don’t con-
ceive of her as a good listener: surely she captures my body language or the tone
of my voice, whilst ignoring the symbolical meanings.\(^\text{14}\) Such typical interactions
appear as accompanied by “responsively attuned” communication (Ferencz-Flatz
2017: 225), which is commonly expressed as an intimate connection one may de-
scribe with words like ‘trust’, ‘friendship,’ or even ‘love’. Such a deep connection
is further expressed in particularly intimate interactions such as play, training, re-
laxation, or care. Such a bodily-guided empathic relation could explain how some
animals possess the ability of “joint attention—of simultaneously focusing on the
same object or event—to actually doing something ‘together’” (ibid.). This be-
comes even more plausible if we take a closer look at the common history we have

3.2 Habitualized interaction with pets

Habitus can be found both on a personal (cf. ibid.: 287-293) and interpersonal
level, which is illustrated by the fact that the scientific attitude is something like a
historically developed common habitus (cf. ibid.: 383ff., 386-389). Concerning
our question, habitualization appears as an attractive conceptual alternative to
classical conditioning (cf. Ferencz-Flatz 2017: 225-231), and as a tool for under-
standing the process of domestication.

Husserl introduces this concept trying to “understand someone’s develop-
ment” and individual personality evolved in one’s history (Husserl 1989: 288,
original emphasis). To understand a person’s habitus is to understand the motiva-
tional structure of the “obscure underlying basis” of what guides the expression
(ibid.: 289, original emphasis). I would like to briefly illustrate this concept with
a personal example: namely, by appealing to the cats Pixi and Merlin, who lived
at my wife’s home. Despite the fact that Pixi and Merlin were both examples of
Felis silvestris catus, they unite different types of habitus, or example, different
styles of walking and eating which correspondingly indicate different characters
(cf. ibid.: 252; 289f.): Where Pixi was direct, hasty, and aggressive, Merlin was

\(^\text{14}\) Despite the importance of the general relation of symptom-signal-behavior for animal
psychology or ethology (cf. Bühler 1990 [1934]: 31), one has to be careful with inter-
pretations. In the mentioned case of my cat, we could interpret her signals (a) as delib-
eratively used representative symbols, or (b) as a driven by a specific reaction to a cer-
tain stimulus, or c) driven by a specific ‘feeding tone’, which specifies this situation in
the surrounding world of a cat (see Uexküll 1956: 107, who discusses this with dogs).
reluctant, cautious, and relaxed. Thus, as I was getting to know my wife, I was also getting to know Merlin and Pixi. Habitus could be seen from this perspective as a specific style which is “something permanent” and, “[a]s a result, one can to a certain extent expect how a man [or a pet] will behave in a given case if one has correctly apperceived him in his person, in his style.” (Ibid.: 283) Certainly, such styles are not written in stone; they are a result of a rich history of experience. For example, the style of Merlin did not change substantially over the years, but was adapted in his old age to the challenges of having weaker senses and slower reactions—so it became necessary to feed him shielded from the view of Pixi, who was still very lively, in order to make sure that he received enough food.

This short example makes it clear that habitualization is not just a process in which individuals are involved as isolated beings; it takes place in the multitude of social relations in a lived history (Pixi-Merlin, Merlin-Wife, Pixi-Wife, Merlin-Pixi-Wife, in childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age etc.). On the one hand, the animal becomes ‘humanized’ which is “more than just the mere labeling of an animal with human predicates; it is also a process of the animal ‘intersubjectively’ accommodating to the commerce with humans” (Ferencz-Flatz 2017: 227). On the other hand, humans become animalized “in the sense that they attune themselves to the behaviors and needs of the animal” (ibid.: 227f.). As a result of this complex interplay between humanization and animalization, we ‘know’ each other by developing common habitūs, which structure our lifeworld, be it spatial, temporal, or personal. Just as pets adapt to the housing situation of their owner, the owner organizes places for the most fundamental needs of her/his pet; likewise, they mutually adapt their biorhythms and interact in concrete embodied practices and individualized patterns including rituals, skills, and norms (cf. ibid.: 225f.; for embodied interaction/shared situations see the contributions of Theissen and Wehrle, this volume). In such common habitualization a “co-constituting [of] an intersubjective context […] for their common activities” (ibid.: 225) takes place, whose most extensive historical form can be seen in domestication. All things considered, we can interpret the notion of common habitūs as a rich resource which informs the situational interactions of humans and pets, thus enabling complex practices.
4. THE INTERTWINING OF SITUATION AND CONTEXT AS A BORDER IN HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONS

But do these findings lead to the consequence that pets can be understood as persons of our lifeworld? And, if yes, does this imply a blurring of the borders between humans and pets on the one hand, and humans and animals on the other? From the Husserlian perspective, which harmonizes surprisingly well with the approach of Michael Tomasello (1999: 4-12), animals in general could not be seen as persons of the spiritual world. According to Husserl, only humans can become persons, insofar as they live in a communicative historico-cultural world, which entails phenomena like tradition, i.e. the transfer of culture over generations (cf. Husserl 1973b: 177-181, 183f.). Yet, with regard to the results regarding the notion of common habitūs, we may be tempted to follow up on Husserl’s own question:

But [what about] pets? Are they not already actual analogues of human beings, or [do they not] indeed already [have] a humanlike personality, albeit at a much lower [level], [but are] just incapable of continuing to develop beyond their beginnings, as our human children [do]? (Ibid.: 185)

But what does ‘analogues of humans’ exactly mean? Does it imply that pets include everything that was ruled out for the animal in general, i.e. that pets are persons living in a socio-cultural world, that they act not only through drives but through a free will, which implies presentations of past and future (Husserl 1993: 304)?

As I want to show, we could make sense of this by understanding the notion of common habitūs as a source of what Bühler discusses in terms of the ‘context’ informing the situation.

4.1 Can pets become persons?

In light of the foregoing, it seems justifiable to assume that animal have what Bühler calls the ‘Origo’: A subjective structure of spatial, temporal, and personal experience of situationality, including a ‘deictic field’ with the possibility of a

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15 Ingold (1994: 84-95) presents a brief historical overview of the typical problems of the more general question of the cognitive capacities of animals.
‘deixis ad oculos.’\textsuperscript{16} But Bühler’s theory of the Origo is part of a larger theory called the “two-field theory” (original emphasis). The two fields are, respectively, the already mentioned “deictic field” with its “deictic words” referring to a ‘situation,’ and, on the other hand, the “synsemantic field” with its “naming words” referring to ‘context’ (Bühler 1990: 81). That means, not just situation, but “situation and context are […] the two sources that in every case contribute to the precise interpretation of utterances” (ibid.: 149).

But why should this be exclusively human? This becomes much clearer if we take into account that context informs situation and vice versa. Because we have a rich source of contextual knowledge about the world, we can grasp the exact meaning of vague utterances like “This is great!” associated with a pointing gesture in a certain situation. For example, one can play a soccer video game with a friend while talking about one’s own past experience with the sport and shouting “This is great!” In this example, all three forms of Deixis appear: we find here the pointing at the visible (\textit{deixis ad oculos}) used with an accompanying “empractical” exclamation (ibid.: 39), a reference to imaginary situations (\textit{phantasmatic deixis}), and a reference to the spoken or written text itself (\textit{anaphorical deixis}).

That is, I may claim that, as a soccer play, I used to do this particular move that I am now doing in the video game while shouting “This is great!” (cf. Bühler 1934: 80, transl. by E. N. D.)

Thus, a human-human relation is defined by a unique intertwining of situation and context. The consequences of this vis-à-vis the issue of human-animal relations, while possibly obvious, are worth reiterating. First, in a human-animal relation a great deal of communication will be transmitted by the situational factor. Second, human-human relations could never be completely the same as human-animal ones for at least three reasons: (a) situations are different due to the mere fact of different senses (cf. Uexküll 1935); (b) situation is informed by context; and (c) even if animals had a non-symbolic system of representation (cf. Lohmar 2016) which would provide contextuality to their experience, the problem of how to communicate with them would still remain. Third, human-animal relations could be better understood if one is able to detect the context which, in each case, we humans share with animals.

\textsuperscript{16} The deixis ad oculos could help us understand how crows are able to communicate specific meanings to their offspring. Thus, the deixis ad oculos could function as “\textit{learning deixis}” (Bühler 1934: 385f., transl. by E. N. D.), endowing a conjunction between what is seen with a specific word, or, in the case of the crows, a specific sound (cf. Cornell/Marzluff/Pecoraro 2011).
In light of these results, the thesis I have defended—stated as a positive counterpart to the approach of emphasizing the a-reflexibility of everyday praxis as a commonality between humans and animals (Ingold 1994: 95ff.)—is that the notion of common habitus could become such a context-factor by augmenting the communicative bond between humans and animals, especially pets. Given that communication functions as a criterion for being part of a community of the spiritual world, it seems quite plausible to understand pets as persons insofar as their actions cannot be understood by appeal to causality, but rather to motivation. Such a step may seem quite remarkable, but it is not totally surprising when we understand the common ground of human-animal relations in terms of embodied, expressive, empathic, and habitualized practices. Of course, these findings are plausible for just these specific domains of our lifeworld, where a certain degree of common habitualization seems possible (this means, higher institutionalized statuses, like being a person in a legal sense, could be ruled out). As a result, we have found in the notion of common habitualization a clear criterion to scrutinize the traditional, rationalistic definitions of person and animal. This clearly shows the contribution that a phenomenology of the lifeworldly experience of nature can offer. By integrating what the natural sciences exclude, it clarifies the objective structure of the subjective experience of nature. However, as Edmund Husserl emphasized, phenomenology has a mediating position between lifeworld and science (cf. Husserl 1976b: 42-60).

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