Torsten Kathke

Wires That Bind

Nation, Region, and Technology in the Southwestern United States, 1854–1920

[transcript] American Culture Studies
The arrival of telegraphy and railroads changed power relations throughout the world in the nineteenth century. In the Mesilla region of the American Southwest, it contributed to two distinct and rapid shifts in political and economic power from the 1850s to the 1920s. Torsten Kathke illustrates how the changes these technologies wrought everywhere could be seen at a much accelerated pace here. A local Hispano elite was replaced first by a Hispano-Anglo one, and finally a nationally oriented Anglo elite. As various groups tried to gain, hold, and defend power, the region became bound ever closer to the US economy and to the federal government.

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Introduction

Looking west on Congress Street, then as now the main thoroughfare of Tucson, Arizona’s downtown business district, one today is hard-pressed to find traces of the dusty, remote desert town that stood here a century earlier. Bland, medium-high office buildings dominate the view. Most of these were built in the mid-1970s, cut-off skyscrapers of the kind developers once haphazardly dropped anywhere in the United States, whether Los Angeles or Cincinnati, Macon or Portland. I-10, Arizona’s principal west–east connector, a good part of which follows the old Butterfield Stage line, separates downtown from communities of spread out, suburban condominium developments.

To the east, the tracks of the erstwhile Southern Pacific Railroad lie beside the eminent Hotel Congress. Built in 1919, the hotel saw the arrest of infamous Depression-Era Public Enemy John Dillinger and his companions in 1934. It now more frequently sees tourists and performances of alternative musicians, the latter of which find a vibrant scene in the desert, as multicultural as the city’s roots would suggest. Tucson is constantly under construction. A modern streetcar line, the first the town has seen in a century, opened to traffic in 2014. There is commercial as well as residential development, aimed at the ever-increasing student population of the University of Arizona, Tucson’s land-grant college turned academic powerhouse.

An underpass beneath the railroad tracks allows passengers traveling on the streetcar to make their way towards the university district by way of the city’s alternative shopping and entertainment mile, 4th Avenue. A grand opening for the underpass was held on August 20, 2009, decreed the 234th anniversary of Tucson’s founding, though due to the city’s several beginnings (Native American settlement, Spanish mission, military fort, Mexican town, American incorporated city) many alternative dates have just as much right to that honor. Tucson is aware of its history as often as it is oblivious to it. It is also still a place where an underpass is news. Despite such occasional small-town antics, Tucson has long surpassed small-town
dimensions. The largest city in the Gadsden Purchase territory at the time of the purchase, and still today at 526,000 inhabitants (almost twice that number in the metro area), it now sits comfortably among the mid-sized cities of the United States.

The rise of the American Southwest as an industrial force and population center in the twentieth century – most pronounced during the Sunbelt years immediately following World War II – is a story of remarkable development. But it is not what gave the region the characteristics that set it apart from other parts of the United States today. Another story, more obscure and buried under the myth of the American West, emerges when one travels back in time further, to the latter half of the nineteenth century. Between the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the end of World War I, Tucson, and the region that surrounds it, experienced a change not only unparalleled in the United States, but singular within a global context as well.

Although the forces that shaped today’s US Southwest were much the same that changed the face of the world during the nineteenth century, here they played out in ways not seen elsewhere. All over the nineteenth-century United States, modern communications technology met established, yet adapting societal structures. In Southern Arizona and New Mexico, however, these structures were in flux. An Anglo-Mexican elite, cooperating and intermarrying by necessity, had formed in this transborder region after the 1854 Gadsden Purchase prompted Anglo-Americans to move into the region, as yet in small numbers. An Anglo, national-minded elite then replaced this bicultural one in the late nineteenth century.

Throughout the United States, processes of racial, cultural, and gender inclusion in and exclusion from the circles of elites were constant during the roughly half-century from the late 1860s to the 1910s. Yet, nowhere else on the continent did American national and business interests, framed in expansionist policy and the overarching reverberations of Manifest Destiny, encounter a setting so fraught with seemingly pre-programmed conflict. In the place where, as New Western historian Patricia Nelson Limerick cheerfully put it, “Anglo America ran into Hispanic America,” European-descended people who considered themselves the rightful heirs to their corner of the world had to contend with Anglo interlopers exhibiting varying degrees of helpfulness and willingness to cooperate.

Native Americans, in turn, had fought, welcomed, unwelcomed, tolerated, or grudgingly accepted the presence of the Spanish for four centuries. They were now

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1 As collected in the magisterial, complementary syntheses of Christopher Bayly and Jürgen Osterhammel. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World; Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World. The German-language original version is: Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt.

2 Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, 222.
faced with yet another faction of white men intent on either reforming or eliminating them. None of these groups was uniform, which created further potential for confusion, contention, and violence. Out of all this conflict arose Anglo-dominated, yet clearly Hispano-infused, culturally hybrid societies and polities; two US territories that became states atypically late by any measure of comparison. The reasons for this were manifold. They were national as well as local, based in racial constructions as well as in politics.

*Figure 1: Arizona and New Mexico*


Although similar in many ways, Arizona and New Mexico also differed in important aspects. These differences, starkly obvious even today, are ultimately grounded in the divergent Hispanic histories of the land which the two modern states comprise. While Arizona Territory in its first census in 1870 had only 9,658 inhabitants (including the Native American population residing in European settlements), New Mexico during the same year boasted 91,874 people. New Mexico’s
population had roughly tripled to 327,301 in 1910, while Arizona’s by that year had increased to twenty times the 1870 number at 204,354. Such divergent growth, in relative as well as absolute figures, naturally led to divergent development, making the half-century or so beginning in the 1870s a most interesting period in the history of the region.

That region and time period are the focus of this study. It centers on three communities: Yuma and Tucson, Arizona, and Deming, New Mexico, all located in the parts of these two Southwestern states that make up the territory last added to the contiguous United States in the Gadsden Purchase. During the period surveyed, the American Southwest was not a straightforward place, and it does not lend itself to a straightforward narrative. Rather, an approach that takes into account fits and starts, complications and the coexistence of seemingly incongruent phenomena is required. Therefore, this book will emphasize the inherent hybridity of cultures and social interactions which the region and the specific places within it produced.

This does not mean that I propose a non-narrative history in which the pieces have no relation to a larger story. The fact that these diverse pieces exist instead is the story. This story – the nationalization of a borderland – was always also that of its opposite. Resistance to the encroaching national state was just as common as the acceptance of its premacy where this seemed prudent. Local contexts continued to coexist with and contradict national, transnational, as well as larger regional ones. To produce a balanced image, personal, governmental, economic, legal and social developments and their intersections must all be allowed to at times be in sharp focus, and at others to fade into the blurred background. As in the swirling visuals produced by a kaleidoscope, the colors do not necessarily match, but they do complement each other.

I will first introduce the three principal locations selected for the study and explain why they were chosen. Following that, I will elaborate on my primary goals in pursuing this study, and its theoretical and methodical underpinnings. I contextualize it within several fields of the historiography of the United States, and especially that of the American West and Southwest, with a secondary focus on borderlands history.

4 The transfer of land was only formally completed in 1854, and even later in practice, with the exit of Mexican troops in 1856. Sonnichsen, *Tucson*, 40; Schmidt, “Manifest Opportunity,” 245.
5 “Narrative,” as David Carr writes, “lies in the objects of historical research, not merely in its own manner of writing about these objects.” It can therefore not easily be escaped. Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, 177.
Although my main time frame of interest is the half-century from 1870 to 1920, it is necessary to go back at least to the formal founding of Tucson, the “Old Pueblo,” in the center of Southern Arizona, in 1775. Tucson is the oldest of the three communities and the only city in today’s Arizona that could be considered a substantial settlement at the time of the Gadsden Purchase.

Yuma, established by the mid-nineteenth century as a steamboating community and military fort on the border to California, lies roughly 350 km (220 miles) west of Tucson, and is still very much a border town. It is close to Mexico, to a string of settlements locally often referred to as Los Algodones as well as just across the Colorado River from California, on the road that on its way west crosses the massively irrigated Imperial Valley and winds through the San Diego Mountains to the west.

Deming, named for the wife of railroad magnate Charles Crocker, at 300 km (185 miles) to the east of Tucson, is just slightly closer to Tucson than Yuma. Located in New Mexico, it lies about 100 km (60 miles) to the east of Arizona’s border with that state. Although the location of Deming had enjoyed brief prominence as an important port of entry into the United States from Mexico before the Gadsden Purchase, the actual town was not founded until 1881, when the railroad connection made it viable.

The fact that these three communities all lie along the Southern Pacific route, and were all established for different purposes at various times during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, will allow for a variegated picture to emerge:

Tucson, which had already served as a base of operations for many businessmen and roving Mexican and Anglo elites before the railroad reached it in 1880, changing the composition of its bicultural and bilingual society for good, will play an especially important role in this context. It was the only major settlement of the Spanish and Mexican eras in the Mesilla, as the region purchased by the US in 1854 is also known. Located on the farthest northern reaches of the Spanish empire, it was the proverbial oasis in the desert manned by a ragtag assortment of Spanish nobles and imperial foot soldiers, held in an impossible balance. It received enough money from the crown to build a fort and send people there, but never enough to sustain them. Even during the few periods of relative lucre, an effective protective force was hard to maintain. Desertions were common, and would have been even more common if it had not been for the distances involved. While Albuquerque and Santa Fe were already considered to be in the imperial boondocks, the latter was the origin of, or destination for most trade in the Hispanic Southwest, and the former at

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6 Figures in km and miles may vary slightly, as they are approximate and rounded up or down to the nearest 5. I will follow this policy throughout, except where more exact numbers are warranted for comprehension, or where numbers are direct quotes.
least lay on the Santa Fe Trail. Even more than these settlements, Tucson was a forgotten part of the Spanish Empire, (un)defended by the underfunded. This uninterrupted Hispanic presence and its location always on the margins of empires and nations, makes it an especially fascinating case for historical investigation. Of the three places studied, the town is undoubtedly the *primus inter pares*.

Yuma, for its part, has a shorter, but arguably livelier history. While interactions between the Spanish and Native Americans played some role at the Yuma Crossing as well, it remained mostly unimportant to the Spanish into the nineteenth century, with only occasional visits, forays, and attempts at conquest upsetting the balance of power among the Yuma and Yaqui Indians already present. Yuma gained in importance from the 1840s onward, when it became a way station on the trail toward California. Supplied by several generations of increasingly powerful riverboats, and settled chiefly on what was to become the Arizona side of the Colorado, Yuma was a place everyone traveled through, and few purposely traveled to. Its prominence rose with the increasing importance of riverboating on the Colorado, and went into a slow but decisive decline once the railroad had not only connected Yuma to San Diego and Los Angeles, but also had connected Tucson and points farther east to those metropolitan centers. Yuma is defined by three borders; the natural one of the Colorado river, which also became the Arizona-California state line – the second border. The third, as elsewhere in the Mesilla, is the US-Mexican national border. In Yuma, it is significantly closer than even in Tucson, comparable only to true border towns such as San Diego, or Nogales.

Deming again shows a different point of view on the Mesilla. The town represents the new kind of settlements that sprung up after the railroads arrived, and its beginnings were similar to those of many other Anglo railroad towns. Although located on land which was much earlier within the Spanish line of settlement (part of the so-called “Hispanic Southwest” around the Santa Fe Trail towns), the spot of Deming itself was not settled until the late nineteenth century. By the 1840s a custom house had been established that functioned as a major port of entry into the United States. It fulfilled this role until the Gadsden Purchase moved the border 60 km (35 miles) farther south. Like Yuma, Deming was a border town, traveled through, but not to. Except for a US Army fort, built near the future townsite in 1863 and manned until the end of the Indian Wars in 1886, little else in the way of Anglo or Hispano settlement stirred in Deming for a while. The actual town was finally incorporated in 1881, when the Southern Pacific designated it a depot and railroad maintenance and refueling station.8

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7 See various places in Hall, *Social Change in the Southwest*, esp. ch. IV, V, and VII.
8 Though it does not show up in New Mexico business listings until later. Not even the 1882/83 Kenney’s business directory has any mention of Deming, or New Chicago.
As the Mesilla slid from Mexico’s authority after the Gadsden Treaty in 1854, and was not yet bound tightly to the American nation through telegraph and railroads, the power vacuum was filled by a bicultural Anglo-Mexican elite of traders, ranchers, and entrepreneurs. This first transitional elite moved easily in both nations, but owed little allegiance to either.9 Their world, by necessity, was a hybrid one. In it, the new American nation was asserting itself. It had to contend for mind-space with the former Mexican one, however, as well as with much more pertinent cultural attachments to the transnational region, and to roots in other countries; many of the regional elite were one or two generations removed from European homelands and carried the cultural baggage of their forebears. This was a familiar refrain in other parts of the United States as well, but nowhere else were so many rivaling identifications and identities in flux at the same time.

The Hispano residents of the Mesilla interpreted US and Mexican themes of national importance in the context of local and regional concerns.10 They created new cultural and social environments, while old ones continued to thrive for a while, then withered. Sonoran social gatherings, many constructed around religious observances pursuant to the Northern Mexican variant of South American Catholicism, remained a fact of life in the Mesilla for decades, but were ultimately doomed. Racial fault lines were not yet rigidly drawn. Anglos included some Mexicans into their racial category of “white.”11 Mexicans saw the new arrivals from both the US North and South as partners in trade, and as co-pioneers on what


9 I take my use of the term transitional elite from Attila Ágh, who applied it to emerging political elites in east-central Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. Although the situations are naturally very different, many attributes of the transitional elites he describes can also be applied to the group I focus on. Most importantly, they came to power suddenly, and lacked professionalism. Ágh’s definition applies both to the Mexican-Anglo elite that held the reins until the 1870s, and the Anglo elite that had replaced it by the late 1880s. Cf. Ágh, “From Nomenclatura to Clientura,” 45–46, 54.

10 Linda Gordon points out that many Mexicans, even decades on, “lived in a border culture […] ; they were not so much binational as they were border people, as if border itself were their nationality.” Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction, 59. Andrés Reséndez makes the point that identity choices follow a mostly situational logic. This means that often, context defined identity. Reséndez, Changing National Identities, 3.

11 For a discussion of the construction of race in post-Civil War America, see Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 92–132.
was at the same time a Mexican northern and American southwestern periphery. The region that was to become southern Arizona and New Mexico in the 1850s reflected the volatility of a middle ground, with actors from a wide variety of backgrounds coming together to form an in-group, excluding Native Americans as a unifying “other”.

This emerging Mexican-Anglo border elite sought out any chance to improve infrastructure in the region, as it benefited their business and personal lives. Unlike previous inhabitants of the Southwest, the center of their world was not primarily defined by the region’s geographic features, but by the national and global forces that surrounded them, even if these were remote. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, for example, changed the routes of world trade by connecting Europe to Asia and points farther east, such as the American West. This, in conjunction with increasing railroad trackage throughout the United States, allowed for the opening of Arizona to large-scale mining in what Thomas Sheridan calls its “extractive” phase of development late in the nineteenth century. Just as changes in modes of transportation and geopolitics allowed for this first elite to develop, they also unmade it a generation later.

Starting in 1880, the elite’s grasp of important local and regional political offices began to erode significantly. They lost more and more political incumbencies to newly arrived Anglos. Unlike the first generation of Anglo settlers, who had been assimilated into Mexican culture and not vice versa, the second wave transported their systems of value and civilization to the Southwest. Since that Southwest had already become much more “civilized” according to the newcomers’ Victorian sensibilities, it was much easier to apply these without much alteration. The reason for

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12 Reséndez has shown these forces at work in the region for the half-century from 1800 to 1850. In many ways, his arguments — that “contentious frontier situations” arise when markets and the state are at odds with each other, complicating the creation of national identities and authority — are reflected here, too. What is today Arizona experienced the pushes and pulls of nationhood and industrialization later than the states to its east and west, beginning only in the 1850s. Cf. Reséndez, passim, but esp. 5; see also Lamar, The Far Southwest, 372.

13 The New Western history has concerned itself extensively with the interactions in the region. The various works of Richard White, William Cronon, and Patricia Nelson Limerick, among others, are all situated in the context of interaction still often popularly referred to as the frontier. Cf. e.g. Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin, Under an Open Sky.

14 Sheridan, Arizona, 103–230.

15 This argument is made chiefly in Chapter 4, extracts of which have been published in modified form as: Kathke, “Power Lines.”

16 Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, 187.
this gradual Victorianization, ironically, had been the efforts of the first generation of arrivals that now found themselves, and their bicultural achievements, left by the wayside. In that sense, some of the noticeable hybridity that had defined the transitional Mesilla region was subsumed into conformity with the dominant culture. This does not contradict the continued existence of strands of hybridity in Southwestern culture. Their overall importance, however, gradually diminished with the Anglo takeover at the end of the nineteenth century.

Still, it is a mistake to regard the initial moving in of Anglo capital and population as a driving out of Hispanic culture and people. On the contrary, often the capital and thus business opportunities (be they trade for the elites, or wage labor for the middle and lower classes) allowed Spanish Americans to continue the expansion of their culture and their frontier, just as it enabled the expansion of the Anglo frontier. The major difference was legal, and thus at first hardly felt despite its ultimately grave effects: it was Anglo-controlled land that Hispanics expanded onto, and adapting to Anglo modes of life, such as homesteading, required them to give up aspects of their own culture. The success of wage labor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Southwest must be seen as both the attempt of Eastern capital to exploit cheap labor, as well as Hispanic Americans’ realization that this was an opportunity to profit both from Anglo modes of economy, such as homesteading, which required a half-year residence on the homestead, and relatively well-paid labor.

The arrival of the railroad in the territory during the early 1880s brought ever more migrants. The once close personal and even familial ties that had bound a smaller Anglo population to a quasi-Mexican society in the 1850s and 1860s started to fade. A nationalizing, imperial-minded, white male elite now oriented itself to California and the East, places where they themselves, in many cases, had been born, or had at least lived for several years. This second transitional elite marked a new stage in Arizona’s move from forgotten outpost to integral part of an industrial system. Like their Anglo-Mexican predecessors, the new Anglo arrivals were at home not only in Arizona, but also across the border, in Sonora. Yet, their approach was distinct for two reasons. For one they invested heavily in Mexican as well as American southwestern mining, and the industries it brought with it. Also, their identity was firmly American, national, and increasingly tied to Arizona in its new shape, and in opposition to New Mexico.

17 Deutsch, *No Separate Refuge*, 34.
18 Ibid., 31.
19 Wage labor paid substantially more than shepherding, for example. Ibid., 29–30.
When Arizona’s capital moved away from Tucson to Prescott, more than 320 km (200 miles) to the northwest, in 1879, and was permanently installed in central Arizonan Phoenix in 1889, this marked a symbolic end to the Anglo-Mexican landholding elite’s dominance in the territory. During much of their struggle for recognition as states, parts of Arizona and New Mexico remained predominantly Mexican both culturally and in population, especially in the swath of land bordering Mexico purchased by the United States in the Gadsden Treaty of 1853. This meant that the identity which the new Anglo arrivals, who gradually came to dominate Arizona politics, carved out for themselves and their territory was an uneasy amalgam in unabating transition. On the one hand, they could not ignore the centuries of Spanish and Mexican dominance that had left indelible cultural marks. On the other hand, modernization and civilization in the conception of the age meant increasingly conforming to Victorian models of behavior and thought, and hardening dichotomous national standards concerning race and gender roles.

Structure of the Project

To tie together several levels – local, regional, state, national, transnational – of a narrative as far-reaching and oftentimes murky to begin with as this is a challenging proposition. Many particular stories could be told within the framework of this book. The choice of which to pursue and which to ignore follows a pragmatic approach: I have selected amongst those that can be gainfully reconstructed from the source material available. Taken together, they create a multicolored wide-angle picture. The goal and structure of this book are to take deep dives into various topics relevant to that picture. Read separately, they illuminate various aspects of the history of the Mesilla at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Put together, they present a larger mosaic of life in the region.

After an overview of methodological and theoretical approaches in Chapter 1, the book follows the trajectory of a regional and political history in Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 through 6, it then concentrates on the national connections that were

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21 Tucson had unceremoniously dropped out of the running four years earlier. A good summation on the machinations behind the move can be found in: Ehrlich, “Arizona’s Territorial Capital Moves to Phoenix,” 231–242.

22 I focus here on interactions between Anglos and Mexicans. Anglo interactions with Native Americans, while undoubtedly important, resembled patterns seen elsewhere in the Western United States during the “Greater Reconstruction,” a useful term coined by Elliott West to differentiate post-Civil War developments of attempting to integrate freed slaves in the East from Indian Wars fought to integrate and “civilize” the remaining tribes in the West. West, The Last Indian War, xvi–xix, 59, 151, 292, 318–319.
made possible by technology and industry, and pushed forward under the rubric of Manifest Destiny and America’s expansionist policies in the nineteenth century.

Chapter 2 will set the stage by describing the region, and its political constituent parts, and further elucidates some theoretical points pertaining to my understanding of the meaning of periphery – using, but also critiquing, world-systems theory.

In Chapter 3, case studies of actors will be intertwined with those of the institutions contributing to the creation of local, regional, and (trans-)national identities, and with the technologies that they employed, controlled, or were subject to. Each person discussed was chosen because they best represent certain aspects of the influence of an institution or organization. Where necessary, an institution will be represented by several people, and where a single person’s presence and influence extend to more than one institution, that person will appear more than once, though naturally in different lights, examined under different aspects. This enables a larger-picture view on the networks that best represent the people described in the source materials, their behaviors, and the reasons for their actions, as informed by culture and context, nation and necessity. Chapter 3 also focuses on the technological aspect of the changes wrought on the Mesilla territory during the half century beginning after the Civil War. In it, I will follow the lead of Brian Balogh in pushing the hypothesis that the postal service not only fulfilled an important role in nationalizing the American West, but that it also did so in a way that on the one hand increased the power of what Balogh, consonant with the parlance of the age, calls the “General Government,” i.e. the complex of politicians, regulators, and nationally-minded industrialists that it is easy to mistake for a coordinated and sustained policy over time. This will be followed by an analysis of where telegraph lines were built, by whom they were established, used, and operated, and how their presence changed communication patterns across the territory. The power relations encapsulated in telegraphic communication deserve special emphasis here. They help explain the specific social role of telegrams. The uniqueness of receiving a telegram influenced how especially people without means to regularly send telegrams themselves reacted to telegraphic communications.

Chapter 4 will focus on the two transitions in power that occurred during the time from the Gadsden Purchase through the 1920s; the first from a quasi-Mexican society to an Anglo-Mexican one, often with Anglos and Hispanics cooperating, but also with underlying conflicts; the second, from such a mixed Anglo-Hispanic territory to one dominated by Anglos, even those who were nowhere near Arizona, through the power of the federal government.

Chapter 5 will tie persons to places by looking at Yuma, Tucson, and Deming as locales first, and then to tie them to people who frequented these places. The structure of the towns’ societies will be discussed in terms of population numbers and spatial arrangements.
Chapter 6 digs deeper into the meaning of American national presence and its effects on the Mesilla by example of the coming of a new and meaningfully different legal system to the region. It discusses the impact that legal battles over land and land use had, and how precedents in water rights were established, re-established, and conveniently ignored by courts pushing agendas of national or local control. It argues that, although the Anglo land grab is commonly believed to be the defining factor in driving out Hispanic influence in the Southwest, at least in parts of the region it occurred predominantly on the national-legal level against the express wishes and recommendations of Anglos tasked with overseeing it on the local and territorial levels.

Finally, the conclusion places the developments described in this book in a larger context within global, North American, and US history. It makes the argument that the special case of Southern Arizona and New Mexico helps explain changes in the status of peripheries in other parts of the world. The American Southwest is not only a vital part of American Western history, but also an exemplar of the vital and complex role of border regions during the era of high nationalism and high imperialism at the turn of the century.